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Politically as well as from the point of view of constitutional law, I see neither good reasons
to generally reject health-related nudging towards less self-damaging behavior (1.), nor
good reasons to issue a general clearance certificate on the grounds that nudging always
leaves the addressee “at liberty” (2.). In both respects, I doubt that pondering or quarrelling
over concepts of “embedded individualism” or “regulatory democracy” will bring us any
closer to rationality of or consensus about the policy choices that have to be made.
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1. General rejection to any sort of auto-health-related nudging (with respect to accountable
persons) would imply that whether, what, where and how much people smoke, drink and
eat or whether they ever rise from their sofa or desk chair in order to get some exercise is a
matter of no concern whatsoever to the state or any other public agency as long as only the
respective individuals´ own health, not that of others, is put at risk. That would amount to
the view that the state must be neutral towards eating, drinking, smoking and physical
inertia habits as it must be towards religious beliefs. To me, this view – which would leave
people exposed to all sorts of nudging by private companies and circumstantial nudging
without allowing the community to produce counterweights which only the community can
provide effectively – has no plausibility whatsoever. And it is certainly not the view of the
German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC).
The FCC has qualified public health as a community value of outstanding importance [1],
capable of justifying interferences with fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution.
This qualification applies not only where state intervention aims at protecting health from
being injured by others (as e.g. in the case of statutory reporting duties concerning
contagious diseases[2]). To give just one example: Considering that in industrialized
countries, more people die from smoking than from transport accidents, AIDS, alcohol,
illegal drugs, murder and suicide taken together, and that in such countries smoking is the
most frequent cause of death from cancer, the FCC held that warning people against these
dangers is a legitimate state responsibility, and that legislation may also interfere with
private companies´ constitutionally protected freedom to exercise their trade by forcing
them to print a warning on their tobacco products[3]. This applies not only to products sold
to minors or other persons generally thought to be legitimate objects of paternalism, but to
tobacco products in general. In other words: the state is not prohibited from taking sides in
matters of public health – neither generally, nor specifically insofar as self-damaging
behavior of accountable persons is concerned.
2. If that is so, the constitutional admissibility of health-related nudging will usually be a
matter of balancing. It is insufficient to point to the fact that people who are just being
nudged are free to resist the nudge. Nudges or regulations concerning nudges can interfere
with constitutional rights in a variety of ways, for instance by shaming people, by forcing
people or companies to nudge others – as in the case of mandatory warnings on tobacco
products –, or by forcing people to opt.
Consider, for instance, nudging by default options, i.e. by selecting standard configurations
which will apply unless individuals opt otherwise. Of the nudging examples given by Thaler
and Sunstein, the most illustrative one is the idea of giving motor cyclists a choice with
respect to wearing a helmet: The default option will be that they have to wear one, but they
can get rid of that obligation by getting special biking training (or, in alternative designs: by
showing that they have insurance, or by marking their bike as belonging to a registered
organ donator). The installation of such a framework interferes with constitutional rights
guaranteed under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG). This is easily overlooked
because of a particular feature of the interference: its alternativity. The biker can choose
between alternative restrictions of his constitutional liberty to act as he wishes[4], i.e.
between the necessity to wear a helmet and the necessity to undergo extra training (or get
insurance, or donate organs), but he will be subject to at least one of them. It is established
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FCC doctrine that interference with a constitutional right is not made constitutionally
irrelevant by allowing to escape it via some alternative option which, if mandatory, would
equally be an interference.[5]
Even where default options charging individuals with no more than a burden to “opt out” –
be it out of a pension scheme or out of donating their organs –, this may be a
constitutionally relevant interference with their right to act (or omit) as they choose (Art. 2 I
GG). Depending on form and frequency of the required act of opting, and probably also
depending on the extent to which the default option can be presumed to be what most
people want, such a burden may easily turn out excessive. Just imagine a statute according
to which you bequeathe your fortune to the republic unless you have made a declaration to
the contrary before a notary public no more than twelve months before your death. I am
positive this would find no mercy before the FCC.
If frequency of the necessity to opt is one of the factors determining the weight of “burdens
of opting out”, the acceptability of mandatory default options may also depend on how
many of them there are. In other words: If default options will turn out a favorite nudging
instrument, as I guess they will, we might get a problem of incrementally summed-up
opting-out-burdens. This type of burden is hard to control by a Constitutional Court whose
immediate object of scrutiny is the incremental unit. Nevertheless – and, politically
speaking: all the more – it ought to be taken into account from the outset in order to avoid
heading towards a “smart republic” keeping us busy opting out of unwelcome choices.
[1] BVerfGE 7, 377 (406, 408, 414 f.); 11, 168 (186); 80, 1 (24).
[2] BVerfGE 32, 373 (380).
[3] BVerfGE 95, 173 (183 ff.).
[4] Art. 2 I GG. For the relevant broad reading of Art. 2 I GG see BVerfGE 80, 137 (153).
[5] See, e.g., 128, 109 (125); more explicitly BVerfG, decision of 28 november 2013 – 2 BvR
2784/12 – (www.bverfg.de).
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